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Abstract
We introduce two mathematical frameworks for foolability in the context of generative
distribution learning. In a nuthsell, fooling is an algorithmic task in which the input sample
is drawn from some target distribution and the goal is to output a synthetic distribution that
is indistinguishable from the target with respect to some fixed class of tests. This framework
received considerable attention in the context of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) –
a recently proposed algorithmic approach which achieves impressive empirical results.
From a theoretical viewpoint this problem seems difficult to model. This is due to the fact
that in its basic form, the notion of foolability is susceptible to a type of overfitting called
memorizing. This raises a challenge of devising notions and definitions that separate between
fooling algorithms that generate new synthetic data versus algorithms that merely memorize
or copy the training set.
The first model we consider is called GAM–Foolability and is inspired by GANs. Here the
learning algorithm (called the generator) has only an indirect access to the target distribution
via a discriminator. The second model, called DP–Foolability, exploits the notion of differential
privacy as a candidate criterion for non-memorization
We proceed and characterize foolability within these two models as well as study their in-
terrelations. We show that DP–Foolability implies GAM–Foolability and prove partial results
with respect to the converse. It remains, though, an open question whether GAM–Foolability
implies DP–Foolability.
We also present an application in the context of differentially private PAC learning: we
show that from a statistical perspective, for any class H, learnability by a private proper
learner is equivalent to the existence of a private sanitizer for H. This can be seen as an
analogue of the equivalence between uniform convergence and learnability in classical PAC
learning.
1 Introduction
With the recent development of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [24], there has been a
growing interest to study algorithms that receive as input a sample of examples and are able to
generate new and original synthetic data. For example, consider an algorithm that receives as
input some tunes from a specific music genre (e.g. jazz, rock, pop) and then outputs a new tune.
Providing a mathematical model for this setting appears to be a challenging task, and at least
apriori, it seems to not fall into the classical framework of classification.
GANs is a recent framework for the construction of such algorithms that received considerable
attention due to empirically impressive results. The training process within GANs proceeds by
letting two neural networks, called generator and discriminator, compete with each other in a
repeated game. The discriminator holds a sample drawn from the target distribution, and the
generator’s goal is to output a synthetic distribution which is close to it. At each step of the
game the generator proposes a synthetic distribution, and the discriminator tries to distinguish it
from the target distribution; then, both networks receive a score that reflects to which extent the
discriminator was able to distinguish between the two distributions, and they perform an update
before proceeding to the next step of the game.
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This naturally suggests to investigate GANs as an optimization algorithm, where the genera-
tor’s objective is to find a distribution that minimizes a certain pseudo-distance from the target
distribution that is induced by a class of discriminating functions [4]. Specifically, let D be the
class of all possible neural networks that may be used by the discriminator then we interpret the
generator’s objective as minimizing the Integral Probability Metric (IPM)1[37] distance between
the two distributions:
IPMD(p, q) = sup
d∈D
∣∣∣∣ Ex∼p[d(x)]− Ex∼q[d(x)]
∣∣∣∣ (1)
However, as observed by [4, 5], there is a critical gap between the task of generating original
synthetic data and the IPM minimization problem: if the discriminator class is “too small” then the
IPM framework allows certain “bad" solutions that memorize. Specifically, let S be a sufficiently
large independent sample from the target distribution and consider the uniform distribution over
S (also known as the empirical distribution) as a candidate solution to the IPM minimization
problem. Standard arguments from statistical learning theory show that with high probability, the
IPM distance between the empirical and the target distribution vanishes as |S| grows (the rate
in which it vanishes depends on the statistical capacity of D – e.g. its size or its VC dimension,
etcetera). Allowing classes with large capacity does not remedy the problem: if the discriminator
class is too large then in general it is information theoretically impossible to output a distribution
whose IPM distance from the target is small.
To illustrate the problem, imagine that our goal is to generate new jazz tunes. Let us consider
the discriminating class of all human music experts. The solution suggested above uses the em-
pirical distribution and simply “generates" a tune from the training set2. This clearly misses the
goal of generating new and original tunes but the IPM distance minimization framework does not
discard this solution.
The starting point of this paper is the above simple observation: memorizing the data leads
to successful IPM minimization. A quantitative version of this phenomenon is then given in
Observation 1. It follows that in order to capture algorithms that generate original data one
has to consider stronger notions, and this work proposes and explores two such notions which we
discuss next.
1.1 Two Models of Foolability
GAM-Foolability. A remarkable property of GANs that potentially reduces the likeliness of
memorization is that the generator’s access to the sample is masked by the discriminator. In more
detail, only the discriminator has access to the target distribution (or rather to the training set).
The generator only has restricted access to the training set via the feedback from the discriminator.
Thus, potentially, the generator may avoid degenerate solutions that memorize as it never directly
observed the sample.
This naturally suggests to investigate GANs as a sequential process [26, 32, 4], and we introduce
the setting of Generative Adversarial Machines (GAMs): we model a sequential game between
a generator (player G) and a discriminator (player D). At each iteration player G proposes a
distribution and player D outputs a discriminating function from a prespecified binary class D.
The game stops when player G proposes a distribution that is close in IPMD distance to the true
target distribution. As we are only concerned with the theoretical limits of the model, we ignore the
optimization and computational complexity aspects and we assume that both players are ominous
in terms of their computational power.
Regarding the question of memorization, even though the generator is not given a direct access
to the training data, it could still be that information about this data could "leak" through the
feedback it receives from the discriminator. This raises the question of whether GAM–Foolability
can provide guarantees against memorization, and perhaps more importantly, in what sense? Our
second model will thus take a more formal approach for preventing memorization. This will enable
us to develop more concrete and quantifiable guarantees that certify non-memorization.
1This is also sometimes called the MMD distance [25], or in the context of neural networks and GANs, this is
called the neural net distance [4].
2There are at most 7 · 109 music experts in the world. Hence, by standard concentration inequalities a sample of
size roughly 9
2
log 10 suffices to achieve IPM distance at most  with high probability.
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DP–Foolability. At the heart of the DP-Fooling model lies a new interpretation of the notion
of differential privacy [20, 19, 17] and we invoke it as a criterion for originality. Formally then,
this model considers differentially private fooling algorithms.
To illustrate our interpretation of differential privacy as a criterion for originality consider the
following situation: imagine that Lisa is a learning painter. She has learned to paint by observing
samples of painting, some of them produced by a mentor painter Mona. After a learning process,
she draws a new painting L. Mona agrees that this new painting is a valid work of art, but Mona
claims the result is not an original painting but a mere copy of a painting, say M , produced by
Mona.
How can Lisa argue that paint L is not a plagiary? The easiest argument would be that she
had never observed M . However, this line of defence is not always realistic as she must observe
some paintings. Instead, we will argue using the following thought experiment: What if Lisa never
observed M? Might she still create L? If this is the case, then one could argue similarly that L is
not a palgiary.
The last argument is captured by the notion of differential privacy. In a nutshell, a ran-
domized algorithm that receives a sequence of data points x¯ as input is differentially private if
removing/replacing a single data point in its input, does not affect its output y by much; more
accurately, for any event E over the output y that has non-negligible probability on input x¯, then
the probability remains non-negligible even after modifying one data point in x¯.
1.2 Our contribution
• We first give characterization of foolable classes in each of these models.
– We show that a class is GAM–Foolable if and only if it has finite Littlestone dimension.
Littlestone classes have been extensively studied in the context of binary online predic-
tion [10, 34]. Therefore, given the sequential nature of the GAM setting, it is natural
that they arise in this context. Nevertheless, the characterization of GAM–Foolability
by Littlestone classes turns out to be technically challenging, and to the best of the
authors knowledge, does not follow via immediate reduction to online prediction.
– We show that a class is DP–Foolable if and only if it is Privately (proper) PAC learn-
able [30]. Interestingly, to prove that Private learning implies DP–Foolability we exploit
the GAM framework. In a nutshell, we construct a DP–fooling algorithm using a GAM
with a private discriminator which is derived from the assumed private PAC learner.
• We next turn to explore the relationship between DP–Foolability and GAM–Foolability.
– In one direction we show that DP–Foolability implies GAM–Foolability. Moreover, the
proof reveals that if a class is DP–foolable by some algorithm then it is DP–foolable by
a GANs-like algorithm in the sequential GAMs–foolability setting.
– The other direction – whether GAM–Foolability implies DP–Foolability – seems more
elusive and we leave it as an open problem. Nevertheless we shed some light on this
problem by relating it to an existing open problem in differential privacy [1].
• Finally, as an application we prove a result in differentially private learning. This result can
be seen as analogue of the equivalence between proper PAC learning and uniform conver-
gence (see, e.g. Theorem 6 in the book [44]). We show that private proper PAC learning
is equivalent to private uniform convergence. Our proof of this fact heavily exploits the
GAM–foolability setting as well as the combinatorial structure of Littlestone classes. This
is perhaps surprising because privacy, learnability, and uniform convergence are notions in
statistics and are seemingly unrelated to the combinatorial/sequential nature of GAM or
Littlestone dimension.
The main results are depicted in Fig. 1 (see the later sections for the formal definitions).
2 Related Work
As discussed, the work in this paper is highly inspired by the recent framework of GANs [24].
Following [4, 5] we relax the Wasserstein distance [3] and consider the IPM distance [37, 25] as the
objective to be minimized by the generator.
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Figure 1: Depiction of main results
The framework of GANs is a strip-mine of new theoretical problems, and has presented nu-
merous challenges, such as mode collapse [36, 3, 47], questions on stability [33, 2, 39], as well as
problems on the diversity of the output [4, 5].
The work presented here focuses on the sole problem of memorization. The question of mem-
orization can be thought of as the problem of generalization within the framework of generative
tasks such as GANs.
The problem of memorization. For qualitative assessment of memorization, it is a common
practice to show synthetic samples next to their nearest neighbor within the training set. [48]
demonstrated how the use of Euclidean distance may be misleading. Alternative metrics are often
used [29] such as feature-space distance. [52] tries to estimate the log likelihood of the output via
Annealed Importance Sampling. [39] suggests “walking on the manifold that is learnt", and checks
for large transition to indicate if memorization has happened.
While it seems there is some inclination to accept that memorization is not an issue [42, 6, 52],
currently most work focuses on empirical studies, experiments and evidence. In fact the notion of
memorization is often not even defined. Here we try to tackle the problem of memorization in a
more formal manner, and aim for a rigorous model that would help study the problem.
In all its characteristic, memorization captures notions such as plagiarism and creativity. Hence
it would be extremely challenging to model it perfectly. However, here we propose a formal criterion
DP, which we believe to be strong enough to ensure lack of memorization. We then proceed to
study which classes are foolable in a DP manner.
Distribution Learning. The model we consider in this work restricts the discriminating func-
tion class and we obtain a game between a discriminator and an ominous generator that is al-
lowed to return an arbitrary distribution. When training GANs, the class of distributions is also
parametrized by neural networks hence have finite capacity. It is possible, then, to consider a dual
approach in which one restricts the generating class; perhaps more akin with traditional generative
learning models such as GMM, HMM etc. (e.g. [38]).
Within the framework of GANs [22] shows how the class of Gaussian can be learned when the
discriminators are quadratic. [6] extends and shows how one can learn, in Wasserstein distance,
certain generator classes such as Mixture of Gaussian, exponential families, and classes generated
by neural networks through choosing a right class of discriminating functions.
DP GANs. We are not the first to suggest differentially private GANs. In fact, one of the
motivation of gans is to provide synthetic data that preserves privacy, and several papers propose
optimization methods for GANs that are differentially private, [7, 53, 49, 13]. Our work differs in
several respects. First, this paper is not concerned, directly, with the privacy of the data sets on
which we train our algorithms. Instead we propose a new interpretation of privacy as a criterion for
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the originality of the outcome, or lack of overfitting. Second, we focus less on providing algorithmic
solutions for optimizing DP-GANs, and we aim to characterize the classes of discriminators that
can be learnt within the framework, efficiency put aside.
Private Synthetic Data. The problem of generating, privately, synthetic data has also seen a
focus of attention within several DP papers. Private synthetic data is a special case of the problem
of sanitization introduced in [12] and further studied in [8]. Theorem 2 provides a reduction
from private (proper and agnostic) PAC learning to the task of generating private synthetic data.
Several other papers suggest private synthetic data generation in the presence of a private learner,
[28, 23]. Most recently [43] provides an efficient algorithm for synthetic data generation that scales
logarithmically with the size of the query class (given a polynomially sized universal identification
sets). However, to the best of our knowledge all previous bounds depend on the size of the query
set or domain.
The results here do not scale with the size of the class. Instead we provide both upper and
lower bounds that scale with the Littlestone dimension of the class.
Like previous work our method relies on a zero sum game between a data player and a query
player (which in GANs terminology are named generator and discriminator), and we employ a non-
regret algorithm over a dual class of functions resulted from swapping the roles of query points
and data points.
The main challenge, when dealing with finite Littlestone classes and not finite classes, is that
existing no-regret algorithms on which we build upon ([10, 34]), do not immediately yield synthetic
distributions over the domain (as for example expert advice or FTPL that can be employed to learn
finite classes). We thus need to develop techniques for producing a distribution when the no-regret
algorithm does not provide one immediately.
3 Prelimineries
In this section we review some of the basic notations we will use as well as recall some standard
definitions and notions in differential privacy and online learning (a more extensive background
is also given in Section 7.1). Throughout the paper we will study classes D of boolean functions
defined on a domain X . However, we will often use a dual point of view where we think of X as the
class of functions and on D as the domain. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, in this section
we let W denote the domain and H ⊆ {0, 1}W to denote the functions class.
3.1 Notations
For a finite3 set W, let ∆(W) denote the space of probability measures over W. Note that W
naturally embeds in ∆(W) by identifying w ∈ W with the Dirac measure δw supported on w.
Therefore, every f : ∆(W) → R induces a W → R function via this identification. In the other
direction, every f : W → R naturally extends to a linear4 map fˆ : ∆(W) → R which is defined
by fˆ(p) = Ep[f ] for every p ∈ ∆(W).
We will often deal with boolean functions f :W → {0, 1}, and in some cases we will treat f as
the subset of W that it indicates. For example, given a distribution p ∈ ∆(W) we will use p(f)
to denote the measure of the subset that f indicates (i.e. p(f) = Prw∼p[f(w) = 1]). Given a class
of functions F ⊆ {0, 1}W , its dual class is a class of F → {0, 1} functions, where each function in
it is associated with w ∈ W and acts on F according to the rule f 7→ f(w). By a slight abuse of
notation we will denote the dual class with W and use w(f) to denoted the function associated
with w (i.e. w(f) := f(w) for every f ∈ F ).
Given a sample S = (w1, . . . , wm) ∈ Wm, the empirical distribution induced by S is the discrete
distribution pS defined by
pS(w) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
1[w = wi].
3The same notation will be used for infinite classes also. However we will properly define the the measure space
and σ-algebra at later sections when we extend the results to the infinite regime.
4A function g : ∆(W)→ R is linear if g(αp1 + (1− α)p2) = αg(p1) + (1− α)g(p2), for all α ∈ [0, 1]
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3.2 Differential Privacy and Private Learning
Differential Privacy [20, 17] is a statistical formalism which aims at capturing algorithmic privacy.
It concerns problems whose input contains databases with private records and it enables to design
algorithms for these problems that are formally guaranteed to protect the private information. For
more background see the surveys [21, 50].
The formal definition is as follows: letWm denote the input space. An input instance Ω ∈ Wm
is called a database, and two databases Ω′,Ω′′ ∈ Wm are called neighbours if there exists a single
i ≤ m such that Ω′i 6= Ω′′i . Let α, β > 0 be the privacy parameters, a randomized algorithm
M :Wm → Σ is called (α, β)-differentially private if for every two neighbouring Ω′,Ω′′ ∈ Wm and
for every event E ⊆ Σ:
Pr
[
M(Ω′) ∈ E] ≤ eα Pr[M(Ω′′) ∈ E]+ β.
An algorithmM : ∪∞m=1Wm → Y is called differentially private if for every m its restriction toWm
is (α(m), β(m))-differentially private, where α(m) = O(1) and β(m) is negligible5. Concretely, we
will think of α(m) as a small constant (say, 0.1) and β(m) = O(m− logm).
Private Learning. Differentially private learning algorithms [30] have been studied extensively
in recent years. In this context the input database is the training set of the algorithm.
Within the PAC model, given a hypothesis class H over a domain W , we say that H ⊆ {0, 1}W
is privately PAC learnable if it can be learned by a differentially private algorithm. That is, if there
is a differentially private algorithm M and a sample complexity bound m(, δ) = poly(1/, 1/δ)
such that for every , δ > 0 and every distribution P over W×{0, 1}, if M receives an independent
sample S ∼ Pm then it outputs an hypothesis hS such that with probability at least 1− δ:
LP(hS) ≤ min
h∈H
LP(h) + ,
where LP(h) = E(w,y)∼P
[
1[h(w) 6= y]]. If the algorithm M is proper, namely hS ∈ H for every
input sample S, then H is said to be Privately Agnostically and Properly PAC learnable (PAP-
PAC-learnable).
In some of our proofs it will be convenient to consider private learning algorithms whose privacy
parameter α satisfies α ≤ 1 (rather than α = O(1) as in the definition of private algorithms). This
can be done without loss of generality due to privacy amplification theorems similar to Lemma 4.
We refer the reader to [50] (Definition 8.2) and references within for further details (see also
discussion after Lemma 4).
Sanitization. The notion of sanitization has been introduced in [12] and further studied in [8].
Let H ⊆ {0, 1}W be a class of functions. An (, δ, α, β,m)-sanitizer for H is an (α, β)-private
algorithm M that receives as an input a sample S ∈ Wm and outputs a function Est : H → [0, 1]
such that with probability at least 1− δ,
(∀h ∈ H) :
∣∣∣Est(h)− |{w ∈ S : h(w) = 1}||S| ∣∣∣ ≤ .
A common type of sanitizers acts as follows: given an input sample S, they publish a sample T
such that with probability at least 1− δ,
(∀h ∈ H) :
∣∣∣ |{w ∈ T : h(w) = 1}||T | − |{w ∈ S : h(w) = 1}||S| ∣∣∣ ≤ .
In other words, they use the estimate Est(h) = |{w∈T :h(w)=1}||T | , which is encoded by T .
We say thatH is sanitizable if there exists an algorithmM and a boundm(, δ) = poly(1/, 1/δ)
such that for every , δ > 0, the restriction of M to samples of size m = m(, δ) is an (, δ, α, β,m)-
sanitizer for H with α = α(m) = O(1) and β = β(m) negligible.
5I.e. β(m) = o(m−k) for every k > 0.
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Private Uniform Convergence. A basic concept in Statistical Learning Theory is the notion
of uniform convergence. In a nutshell, a class of hypotheses H satisfies the uniform convergence
property if for any unknown distribution P over examples, one can uniformly estimate the expected
losses of all hypotheses in H given a large enough sample from P . Uniform convergence and
statistical learning are closely related. For example, the Fundamental Theorem of PAC Learning
asserts that they are equivalent for binary-classification [44].
This notion extends to the setting of private learning: a class H satisfies the Private Uniform
Convergence property if there exists a differentially private algorithm M and a sample complexity
bound m(, δ) = poly(1/, 1/δ) such that for every distribution P over W × {0, 1} the following
holds: ifM is given an input sample S of size at least m(, δ) which is drawn independently from P,
then it outputs an estimator Lˆ : H → [0, 1] such that with probability at least (1− δ) it holds that
(∀h ∈ H) : ∣∣Lˆ(h)− LP(h)∣∣ ≤ .
Note that without the privacy restriction, the estimator
Lˆ(h) = LS(h) :=
|{(wi, yi) ∈ S : h(wi) 6= yi}|
|S|
satisfies the requirement for m = O˜(d/2), where d is the VC-dimension of H; indeed, this follows
by the celebrated VC-Theorem [51, 44].
3.3 Littlestone Dimension
The Littlestone dimension is a combinatorial parameter that characterizes regret bounds in online
learning6 [34, 10], but also have recently been related to other concepts in machine learning such
as differentially private learning [1]. Perhaps surprisingly, the notion also plays a central role in
Model Theory ([46, 16], and see [1] for further discussion).
The definition of this parameter uses the notion of mistake-trees: these are binary decision
trees whose internal nodes are labelled by elements of W. Any root-to-leaf path in a mistake tree
can be described as a sequence of examples (w1, y1), ..., (wd, yd), where wi is the label of the i’th
internal node in the path, and yi = +1 if the (i + 1)’th node in the path is the right child of the
i’th node, and otherwise yi = 0. We say that a tree T is shattered by H if for any root-to-leaf path
(w1, y1), ..., (wd, yd) in T there is h ∈ H such that h(wi) = yi, for all i ≤ d.
The Littlestone dimension of H, denoted by Ldim(H), is the maximum depth of a complete
tree that is shattered by H.
The dual Littlestone Dimension which we will denote by Ldim∗(H) is the Littlestone dimension
of the dual class (i.e. we consider W as the hypothesis class and H is the domain). We will use
the following fact:
Lemma 1. [Corollary 3.6 in [11]] Every class H has a finite Littlestone dimension if and only if
it has a finite dual Littlestone dimension. Moreover we have the following bound:
Ldim∗(H) ≤ 22Ldim(H)+2 − 2
4 Foolability models
In this section we define the three models of foolability that are discussed in this paper.
Let X be a domain7 and let D ⊆ {0, 1}X be a class of functions. The class D is referred to as
the discriminating functions class and its members d ∈ D are called discriminating functions or
distinguishers.
Given two distributions p, q ∈ ∆(X ), let IPMD(p, q) denote the IPM distance between p and q:
IPMD(p, q) = sup
d∈D
∣∣∣p(d)− q(d)∣∣∣.
6See Section 7.1.2 for further discussion on online learning.
7Our arguments exploit standard tools from probability (e.g. Uniform Convergence for VC classes) and analysis
(i.e. Vonneuman’s Minmax Theorem). Applying these results when X is infinite requires measurability/topological
assumptions. We omit discussing these assumptions in the main text and refer the reader to Appendix B for more
details.
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It will be convenient to assume that D is symmetric, i.e. that whenever d ∈ D then also its
complement, 1 − d ∈ D. Assuming that D is symmetric will not lose generality and will help
simplify notations. Under this assumption we can remove the absolute value from the definition
of IPM:
IPMD(p, q) = sup
d∈D
(p(d)− q(d)) . (2)
4.1 Foolability
We begin with the first and most basic model, called foolability, the goal of the fooling algorithm
is to find any distribution which is indistinguishable from the target distribution. As we will see,
this form of foolability has the disadvantage of accommodating memorizing algorithms. We then
proceed to define the refinements of GAM–Foolability and DP–Foolability which, to a certain ex-
tent, prevent memorization. As argued in the introduction, DP–Foolability prevents memorization
in a stronger (and better defined) way.
Definition 1 (Fooling Algorithm). A fooling algorithm for D with sample complexity m(, δ) is
an algorithm M that receives as input a sample S of points from X and parameters , δ such that
the following holds: for every , δ > 0 and every target distribution preal, if S is an independent
sample of size at least m(, δ) from preal then
Pr
[
IPMD(psyn, preal) < 
]
≥ 1− δ,
where psyn := M(S) is the distribution outputted by M , and the probability is taken over S ∼
(preal)
m as well as over the randomness of M .
We will say that a class is foolable if it can be fooled by an algorithm whose sample complexity
is poly(1 ,
1
δ ). Our starting point is the next characterization of foolability. This characterization
is an immediate corollary (or rather a reformulation) of the celebrated VC Theorem ([51]).
Denote by Memp an algorithm that receives a sample S and returns Memp(S) := pS , the
empirical distribution over S.
Observation 1 ([51]). The following statements are equivalent for class D ⊆ {0, 1}X :
1. D is PAC–learnable.
2. D is foolable.
3. D satisfies the uniform convergence property.
4. D has a finite VC-dimension.
5. Memp is a fooling algorithm for D with sample complexity m = O( log 1/δ2 ).
Observation 1 shows that foolability is equivalent to PAC-learnability (i.e. finite VC dimension).
We will later see analogous results for DP–Foolability (which is equivalent to differentially private
PAC learnability) and GAM–Foolability (which is equivalent to online learnability). Observation 1
highlights the fact that any foolable class can be fooled by an algorithm which memorizes its input.
Thus, we would like to refine definition of foolability in a way that discards memorizing algorithms.
This brings us to the stronger models of DP–Foolability and GAM–Foolability which are defined
next.
4.2 GAM–Foolability
We now describe the second model of foolability which is inspired by GANs and provides an
abstract setting of sequential adversarial training.
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Generative Adversarial Machines. A Generative Adversarial Machine (GAM) can be thought
of as a sequential game between two players called the generator (denoted by G) and the discrim-
inator (denoted by D). At the beginning of the game, the discriminator D receives the target
distribution which is denoted by preal. The goal of the generator G is to find a distribution p such
that p and preal are -indistinguishable with respect to some prespecified discriminating class D
and an error parameter  > 0 (both players know D,  ), i.e.
IPMD(p, preal) ≤ .
The game proceeds in rounds, where in each round t the generator G submits to the discrim-
inator a candidate distribution pt and the discriminator replies according to the following rule:
if IPMD(pt, preal) ≤  then the discriminator replies “WIN” and the game terminates. Else, the
discriminator picks dt ∈ D such that |preal(dt) − pt(dt)| > , and sends dt to the generator along
with a bit which indicates whether pt(dt) > preal(dt) or pt(dt) > preal(dt). Equivalently, instead
of transmitting an extra bit, we assume that the discriminator always sends dt ∈ D ∪ (1−D) s.t.
preal(dt)− pt(dt) > . (3)
Definition 2 (GAM–Foolability). Let  > 0 and let D be a discriminating class.
1. D is called -GAM–Foolable if there exists a generator G and a bound T = T () such that G
wins any discriminator D with any target distribution preal after at most T rounds.
2. The round complexity of GAM–Fooling D is defined as the minimal upper bound T () on the
number of rounds that suffice to –Fool D.
3. D is called GAM–Foolable if it is -GAM foolable for every  > 0 with T () = poly(1/).
In the next section we will see that if D is -GAM–Foolabe for some fixed  < 1/2 then it is
GAM–Foolable with round complexity T () = O(1/2).
Randomness. We stress out that we assume that both the generator and discriminator are de-
terministic. This assumption is made to simplify the presentation but does not restrict the validity
of our results, as we explain next. Consider a setting where the players may use randomness and
the definition of round complexity is modified by taking expectation. Assuming a deterministic
discriminator does not lose generality because in each round the discriminator plays only after
seeing the generator’s submitted distribution and so it may always respond deterministically. Re-
stricting the generator to be deterministic is more subtle. However, in terms of upper bounds it
only strengthen our result (because we only use deterministic generators, whereas randomized ones
could potentially be stronger), and in terms of our lower bound (Theorem 1, Item 2), its proof
applies verbatim to the expected round complexity of randomized generators.
4.3 DP–Foolability
We next introduce the notion of DP–Fooling algorithms and DP–Foolability which is central to
this work. As discussed in the introduction, these are algorithms that fool a discriminating class
D, while avoiding memorization or overfitting of their training set.
Definition 3 (DP-Fooling Algorithm). A DP-Fooling algorithm M for a class D is an algorithm
that receives as an input a finite sample S and two parameters (, δ) and satisfies:
• Differential Privacy. For every m, the restriction of M to input samples S of size m is
(α(m), β(m))-differentially private, where α(m) = O(1) and β(m) is negligible.
• Fooling. M fools D: there exists a sample complexity bound m = m(, δ) such that for
every target distribution preal if S is a sample of at least m examples from preal then
IPMD(psyn, preal) ≤  with probability at least 1 − δ, where psyn is the output of M on
the input sample S.
We will say in short that a class D is DP– Foolable if there exists a DP-Fooling algorithm for
the class D with sample complexity m = poly(1/, 1/δ).
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5 Results
5.1 GAM–Foolability
Our first main result characterizes the GAM–Foolable classes and provides quantitative upper and
lower bounds on their round complexity in terms of the Littlestone dimension.
Theorem 1 (Quantitative round-complexity bounds). Let D be class with dual Littlestone dimen-
sion `∗ and let T () denote the round complexity of GAM–Fooling D. Then,
1. T () = O
(
`∗
2 log
`∗

)
for every .
2. T () ≥ `∗2 for every  < 12 .
To prove Item 1 we construct a generator with winning strategy which we outline in Section 6.
A complete proof of Theorem 1 appears in Section 7.2.1.
As a corollary we get the following characterization of GAM–Foolability:
Corollary 1 (Characterization of GAM–Foolability). The following are equivalent for a class
D ⊆ {0, 1}X :
1. D is GAM–Foolable.
2. D is -GAM–Foolable for some  < 1/2.
3. D has a finite dual Littlestone dimension.
4. D has a finite Littlestone dimension.
Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorem 1 (which gives the equivalences 1 ⇐⇒ 2 ⇐⇒ 3)
and from Lemma 1 (which gives the equivalence 3 ⇐⇒ 4). We point out that Lemma 1 was
known prior to this work.
Tightness of  = 12 . The implication Item 2 =⇒ Item 1 can be seen as a boosting result: i.e.
“weak” foolability for some fixed  < 1/2 implies “strong” foolability for every . The following
example demonstrates that the dependence on  in Item 2 can not be improved beyond 12 : let X be
the unit circle in R2, and let D consist of all arcs whose length is exactly half of the circumference.
It is easy to verify that the uniform distribution µ over X satisfies IPMD(µ, preal) ≤ 12 for any
target distribution preal (since µ(d) = 12 for all d ∈ D). Therefore D is ( = 12 )-GAM–Foolable
with round complexity T ( 12 ) = 1. On the other hand, D has an infinite Littlestone dimension and
therefore is not GAM–Foolable.
5.2 DP–Foolability
Our second main result characterizes DP–Foolability in terms of basic notions from differential
privacy and PAC learning.
Theorem 2 (Characterization of DP–Fooling). The following statements are equivalent for a class
D ⊆ {0, 1}X :
1. D is privately and properly learnable in the agnostic PAC setting.
2. D is DP–Foolable.
3. D is sanitizable.
4. D satisfies the private uniform convergence property.
The implication Item 3 =⇒ Item 1 was known prior to this work and was proven in [8].
The equivalence among Items 2 to 4 is natural and expected. Indeed, each of them expresses
the existence of a private algorithm that publishes certain estimates of all functions in D (e.g. in
uniform convergence losses are estimated and in sanitization averages are estimated).
The fact that Item 1 implies the other three items is perhaps more surprising. Interestingly,
our proof of that exploits the GAMs framework from the previous section. In a nutshell, we show
that Item 1 implies Item 2 by constructing a DP–fooling algorithm which is based on a GAM with
a private discriminator. This private discriminator is derived from the private PAC learner whose
existence is assumed by Item 1. See Section 7.3 for a complete proof.
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Private learnability versus private uniform convergence. The equivalence Item 1 ⇐⇒
Item 4 is between private learning and private uniform convergence. The non-private analogue of
this equivalence is a cornerstone in statistical learning; it reduces the statistical challenge of mini-
mizing an unknown population loss to an optimization problem of minimizing a known empirical
estimate. In particular, it yields the celebrated Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) principle:
“Output h ∈ H that minimizes the empirical loss”. We therefore highlight this equivalence in the
following corollary:
Corollary 2 (Private proper learning = private uniform convergence). Let H ⊆ {0, 1}X . Then H
is privately and properly PAC learnable if and only if H satisfies the private uniform convergence
property.
5.3 GAMs versus DP-Fooling
So far we have introduced and characterized two formal approaches towards handling memorization
(or ensure originality). The first approach uses the setting of GAMs which attempts to prevent
memorization by masking the algorithm’s access to the training set via a discriminator. The second
approach suggests the definition of differential privacy to restrict the algorithm from memorizing
its input sample and enjoy formal guarantees that support non-memorization/originality. It is
therefore natural to compare and seek connections between these two approaches. We first note
that the DP setting may only be more restrictive than the GAMs setting:
Corollary 3 (DP–Foolability implies GAM–Foolability). Let D be a finite class that is DP–
Foolable. Then D has finite Littlestone dimension and in particular is GAM–Foolable.
Corollary 3 follows from Theorem 2: indeed, the latter yields that DP–Foolability is equivalent
to PAP-PAC learnability, and by [1, 14] PAP-PAC learnability implies a finite Littlestone dimension
which by Corollary 1 implies GAM–Foolability.
The universality of GAMs-based DP algorithms. Our proofs reveal a stronger phenomenon
than Corollary 3. In more detail, Theorem 2 shows that DP-Foolability and proper agnostic private
learning (PAP-PAC) are equivalent. Proving the direction that PAP-PAC implies DP-Foolability
obtains a DP algorithm by invoking a GAM with a differentially private discriminator. This
establishes universality of such GAMs-based algorithms in the following sense: for any D, if it can
be fooled by some DP algorithm then it can also be fooled by a DP algorithm which is based on
a GAM with a differentially private discriminator.
Towards a converse of Corollary 3. By the above it follows that the family of classes D
that can be fooled by a DP algorithm is contained in the family of all GAM–Foolable classes;
specifically, those which admit a GAM with a differentially private discriminator.
We do not know whether the converse holds; i.e. whether “GAM–Foolability =⇒ DP– Foolabil-
ity”. Nevertheless, the implication “PAP-PAC learnability =⇒ DP–Foolability” (Theorem 2) can
be regarded as an intermediate step towards this converse. Indeed, as discussed above, PAP-PAC
learnablity implies GAM–Foolablility. It is therefore natural to consider the following question,
which is equivalent8 to the converse of Corollary 3:
Question 1. Let D be a class that has finite Littlestone dimension. Is D properly and privately
learnable in the agnostic PAC setting?
A weaker form of this question – Whether every Littlestone class is privately PAC Learnable?
– was posed by [1] as an open question.
6 A strategy for GAM–Fooling
In this section we present the generator’s strategy which is used in the proof of Theorem 1, Item 1
to fool a class D with dual Littlestone dimension `∗. We will assume that D is symmetric (i.e. that
D = 1−D). This assumption does not affect generality since one can symmetrize D by adding to
8I.e. an affirmative answer to Question 1 is equivalent to the converse of Corollary 3.
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it all functions in 1−D. This modification does not change the dual Littlestone dimension nor the
associated GAM game.
The generator uses an online learner A for the dual class of ∆(D) ⊆ [0, 1]X whose existence
is proved in Corollary 4, and we refer the reader to Section 7.1 for further background in online
learning as well as the exact statements. In a nutshell, A receives, sequentially, labelled examples,
(d¯t, yt), from the domain ∆(D) × {0, 1} and returns at each step t a predictor fˆt of the type
fˆt(d¯) = Ed∼d¯ [ft(d)] for some function ft over the domain D. Moreover A has the following
guarantee over what we define as its regret:
REGRETT (A) :=
T∑
t=1
|fˆt(d¯t)− yt| −min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
| E
d∼d¯t
[x(d)]− yt| ≤
√
1
2
`∗T log T ,
Recall from Section 3.1 that each hypothesis in the dual class is associated with an x ∈ X that
acts on D by “d 7→ d(x)”, and that we use X to denote the dual class and x to denote the function
associated with x (i.e. x(d) := d(x)). We further extend each x to a linear function over ∆(D) by
x(q) := Ed∼q[x(d)] (as in Section 3.1)).
• Let D be a symmetric class with Ldim∗(D) = `∗, and let  > 0 be the error parameter.
Pick A to be an online learner for the dual class X like in Corollary 4, and set
T =
⌈4`∗
2
log
4`∗
2
⌉
= O
(`∗
2
log
`∗

)
.
• Set fˆ1(d¯) = Ed∼d¯[f1(d)] as the predictor of A at its initial state.
• For t = 1, . . . , T
1. If there exists pt ∈ ∆(X ) such that
(∀d ∈ D) : E
x∼pt
[ft(d)− x(d)] ≤ 
2
,
then
– pick such a pt and submit it to the discriminator.
∗ If the discriminator replies with “Win” then output pt.
∗ Else, receive from the discriminator dt ∈ D such that preal(dt)− pt(dt) ≥ 
∗ Set d¯t = δdt , and yt = 1.
2. Else
– Find d¯t ∈ ∆(D) such that(∀x ∈ X ) : E
d∼d¯t
[ft(d)− x(d)] > 
2
(if no such d¯t exists then output “error”).
– Set yt = 0.
– Submit pt = pt−1 to the discriminator and proceed to item 3 below (i.e. here the
generator sends a dummy distribution to the discriminator and ignores the answer).
3. Update A with the observation (d¯t, yt), receive fˆt+1, set ft+1 such that fˆt+1(d¯) =
Ed¯[ft+1(d)] (such ft+1 exists by the assumed properties of A – see Corollary 4), and
proceed to the next iteration.
• Output “Lost” (we will prove that this point is never reached).
Figure 2: A fooling strategy for the generator with respect to a symmetric discriminating class D.
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Proof overview of Theorem 1, Item 1. We begin by considering a simpler setting where
it is assumed that the learner A is ∆(X )-proper in the sense that at each iteration t it uses a
predictor fˆt = Ep[ft], where ft is a weighted average of hypotheses in X ; namely,
(∀d ∈ D) : ft(d) = pt(d) = E
x∼pt
[x(d)], (4)
for some pt ∈ ∆(X ). Let us denote this learner by A∆. We note in passing that Eq. (4) holds,
for example, if one considers finite domains X and allows the regret to scale with the size of the
domain instead of the Littlestone dimension. In this case we can concretely choose our online
learner to be a Weighted majority algorithm [35], which satisfies Eq. (4). Indeed, similar uses of
the Weighted majority have been applied to generate synthetic data over finite domains [28, 27].
Coming back to the proof overview, the crucial point is that if ft satisfies Eq. (4) then the
generator can submit pt ∈ ∆(X ) to the discriminator. Specifically, the generator can use A∆ as
follows: at each iteration t, submit pt to the discriminator; then, unless pt fools D and the generator
wins, receive a discriminator dt and obtain ft+1 by feeding the labelled example (δdt , 1) to A∆.
We claim that after at most O˜( `
∗
2 ) iterations the generator outputs a distribution that fools D:
indeed, if the algorithm continues for more than T iterations then for each t ≤ T ,
preal(dt)− fˆt(δdt) = preal(dt)− pt(dt) ≥ .
Therefore, such a T must satisfy:
 · T ≤
T∑
t=1
preal(dt)− pt(dt) ≤
T∑
t=1
preal(dt)− fˆt(dt) =
T∑
t=1
|yt − fˆt(dt)| − |yt − preal(dt)|
=
T∑
t=1
|yt − fˆt(dt)| −
T∑
t=1
∣∣yt − E
x∼preal
[x(dt)]
∣∣ ≤ T∑
t=1
|yt − fˆt(dt)| −min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
|yt − x(dt)|
= REGRETT (A∆) = O˜(
√
`∗T ),
Where the first equality is true since yt = 1. This implies that T = O˜( `
∗
2 ) as required.
We next proceed to the general case. The main challenge is that existing online classification
algorithms (including the algorithm implied by Corollary 4) are not necessarily ∆(X )-proper. To
bypass it, we first observe that one can relax the requirement that A is ∆(X )-proper to the
requirement that A is ∆(X )-dominated in the sense that
(∀d ∈ D) : ft(d) ≤ pt(d), (5)
for some pt ∈ ∆(X ). Indeed, the above calculation remains valid under this weaker assumption.
With this definition in hand we employ the minimax theorem to identify the following win-win
situation: we check whether the predictor ft which is provided by A is sufficiently close to satisfying
Eq. (5) (see the condition in the “If” statement in Item 1 of Fig. 2) and proceed as follows:
• If ft is sufficiently close to satisfying Eq. (5) then continue like before: in this case ft(d) ≤
Ex∼pt [x(d)] + O() for every d ∈ D. The generator then submits pt to the discriminator
and uses the discriminator dt provided by the discriminator as before to feed A with the
example (dt, 1). By a similar calculation like above, this yields an increase of Ω() to the
regret of A. This case is depicted in Item 1 in Fig. 2.
• In the complementing case, a minimax argument implies that there exists d¯t ∈ ∆(D) that
separates ft from all dual hypotheses x ∈ X (see Lemma 5 below):(∀x ∈ X ) : E
d∼d¯t
[ft(d)] > E
d∼d¯t
[x(d)] +

2
By linearity, a corollary of the above equation is that Ed∼d¯t [ft(d)] > Ed∼d¯t [preal(d)] +

2 .
We, Thus, interpret d¯t as a distinguishing function, and provide it to the learner A with a
label yt = 0 and yield an increase of Ω() to its regret. Note that here the discriminator is
not used to find d¯t. This case is depicted in Item 2 in Fig. 2
To summarize, in each of the two cases, the regret of A is increased by Ω(). Therefore, by the
bound on A’s regret, it follows that after at most O˜(`∗/2) rounds, the generator finds a fooling
distribution.
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7 Proofs
7.1 Background
7.1.1 Basic properties of Differential Privacy
We will use the following three basic properties of algorithmic privacy.
Lemma 2 (Post-Processing (Lemma 2.1 in [50])). If M : Wm → Σ is (α, β)-differentially private
and F : Σ→ Z is any (possibly randomized) function, then F ◦M : Wm → Z is (α, β)-differentially
private.
Lemma 3 (Composition (Lemma 2.3 in [50])). Let M1, ...,Mk : Wm → Σ be (α, β)-differentially
private algorithms, and define M :WM → Σk by
M(Ω) =
(
M1(Ω),M2(Ω), . . . ,Mk(Ω)
)
.
Then, M is (kα, kβ)-differentially private.
Lemma 4 (Privacy Amplification (Lemma 4.12 in [14])). Let α ≤ 1 and let M be a (α, β)-
differentially private algorithm operating on databases of size u. For v > 2u, construct an algorithm
M ′ that on input database Ω ∈ Wv subsamples (with replacement) u points from Ω and runs M
on the result. Then M ′ is (α˜, β˜)-differentially private for
α˜ = 6αu/v β˜ = exp(6αu/v)
4u
v
β.
We remark that the requirement α ≤ 1 can be replaced by α ≤ c for any constant c at the
expanse of increasing the constant factors in the definitions of α˜ β˜. This follows by the same
argument that is used to prove Lemma 4 in [14].
7.1.2 Online Learning
The Online learnability of Littlestone classes has been established by [34] in the realizable case and
by [10] in the agnostic case. Ben-David et al’s [10] agnostic Standard Online Algorithm (SOA) will
serve as a workhorse for our main results and we thus recall the online learning setting and state
the relevant results. For a more exaustive survey on online learning we refer the reader to [15, 45].
In the a binary online setting we assume a domain W and a space of hypotheses H ⊆ {0, 1}W .
We consider the following oblivious setting which can be described as a repeated game between a
learner L and an adversary continuing for T rounds; the horizon T is fixed and known in advanced
to both players. At the beginning of the game, the adversary picks a sequence of labelled examples
(wt, yt)
T
t=1 ⊆ W × {0, 1}. Then, at each round t ≤ T , the learner chooses (perhaps randomly) a
mapping ft : W → [0, 1] and then gets to observe the labelled example (wt, yt). The performance
of the learner L is measured by her regret, which is the difference between her loss and the loss of
the best hypothesis in H:
REGRETT (L; {wt, yt}Tt=1) =
T∑
t=1
E [|ft(wt)− yt|]−min
h∈H
∑
|h(wt)− yt|, (6)
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the learner. Define
REGRETT (L) = sup
{wt,yt}Tt=1
REGRETT (L; {wt, yt}Tt=1).
The following result establishes that Littlestone classes are learnable in this setting:
Theorem 3. [[10]] Let H be a class with Littlestone dimension ` and let T be the horizon. Then,
there exists an online learning algorithm L such that
REGRETT (L) ≤
√
1
2
` · T log T
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We will need the following corollary of Theorem 3. Recall that ∆(W) denotes the class of dis-
tributions over W, and that every f :W → [0, 1] extends linearly to ∆(W) by fˆ(p) = Ew∼p[f(w)].
The next statement concerns an online setting where the labelled example are of the form (pt, yt) ∈
∆(W)× {0, 1}, and the regret of a learner L with respect to H ⊆ {0, 1}W is defined by replacing
each h by its linear extension hˆ:
REGRETT (L; {pt, yt}Tt=1) =
T∑
t=1
E [|ft(pt)− yt|]−min
h∈H
∑
|hˆ(pt)− yt|
=
T∑
t=1
E [|ft(pt)− yt|]−min
h∈H
∑
| E
x∼pt
[h(w)]− yt|
Corollary 4. Let H be a finite class with Littlestone dimension ` and let T be the horizon. Then,
there exists a deterministic online learner L that receives labelled examples from the domain ∆(W)
such that
REGRETT (L) ≤
√
1
2
`T log T
Moreover, at each iteration t the predictor used by L is of the form fˆt(p) = Ew∼p[ft(w)], where ft
is some W → [0, 1] function.
Corollary 4 follows from Theorem 3; see Appendix A for a proof.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 1
7.2.1 Upper Bound: Proof of Item 1
In this section we prove the upper bound presented in Theorem 1 in the case where X is finite
(and in turn, D ⊆ {0, 1}X is also finite). The general case is proven in a similar fashion but is
somewhat more delicate. The general proof is then given in Appendix B.
First note that we may assume without loss of generality that D is symmetric. Indeed, if D is
not symmetric then we may replace D with D∪ (1−D), noting that this does not affect the GAM
game, namely (i) IPMD = IPMD∪(1−D) (and so the goal of the generator remains the same), and (ii)
the set of distinguishers the discriminator may use remains the same (recall that the discriminator
is allowed to use distinguishers from 1 − D). Also, one can verify that this modification does not
change the dual Lttlestone dimension (i.e. Ldim∗(D) = Ldim∗(D ∪ (1−D))).
Therefore, we assume D is a finite symmetric class with dual Littlestone dimension `∗. The
generator used in the proof is depicted in Fig. 2. The generator uses an online learner A for the
dual class X with domain ∆(D) as in Corollary 4, where the horizon is set to be T = ⌈ 4`∗2 log 4`∗2 ⌉.
Let D be an arbitrary discriminator, let preal ∈ ∆(X ) be the target distribution, and let  > 0 be
the error parameter. The proof follows from the next lemma:
Lemma 5. Let D be a finite set of discriminators, let f : D → [0, 1], Assume that,(∀p ∈ ∆(X ))(∃d ∈ D) : E
x∼p
[f(d)− x(d)]) > /2.
Then: (∃d¯ ∈ ∆(D))(∀x ∈ X ) : E
d∼d¯
[f(d)− x(d)] > /2.
Before proving this lemma, we show how it implies the desired upper bound on the round
complexity. We first argue that the algorithm never outputs “error”: indeed, since A only uses
predictors of the form fˆt(d¯) = Ed¯[ft], Lemma 5 implies that whenever Item 2 in the “For” loop is
reached then an appropriate d¯t ∈ ∆(D) exists and therefore the algorithm never outputs “error”.
Next, we bound the number of rounds: let T ′ ≤ T be the number of iterations performed when
the generator G runs against the discriminator D. The only way for the generator to lose is if the
“For” loop ends without its winning and T ′ = T . Thus, It suffices to show that T ′ < T . The
argument proceeds by showing that the regret of A in each iteration t ≤ T ′ increases by at leas /2.
This, combined with the bound on A’s regret (from Corollary 4) will yield the desired bound.
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We begin by analyzing the increase in A’s regret. Let (d¯1, y1), . . . , (d¯T ′ , yT ′) and fˆ1, . . . , fˆT ′ be
the sequences obtained during the execution of the algorithm as defined in Fig. 2. Recall from
Corollary 4 that fˆt(d¯) = Ed∼d¯[ft(d)], where ft : D → [0, 1]. We claim that the following holds:
(∀t ≤ T ′) :
{
Ed∼d¯t
[
preal(d)− ft(d)
] ≥ 2 if yt = 1,
Ed∼d¯t
[
ft(d)− preal(d)
] ≥ 2 if yt = 0. (7)
Indeed, if yt = 1 then by Fig. 2, the chosen pt satisfies
(∀d ∈ D) : ft(d)− E
x∼pt
[x(d)] ≤ 
2
.
Since the discriminator replies with dt such that preal(dt)−pt(dt) ≥ , and d¯t = δdt , it follows that
E
d∼d¯t
[
preal(d)− ft(d)
]
= E
d∼d¯t
[preal(dt)]− E
d∼d¯t
[ft(dt)]
= preal(dt)− ft(dt) (because d¯t = δdt)
≥ E
x∼preal
[x(dt)]−
(
E
x∼pt
[x(dt)] + /2
)
= preal(dt)− (pt(dt) + /2)
≥ 
2
,
which is the first case in Eq. (7). Next consider the case when yt = 0. Since the algorithm never
outputs “error”, Fig. 2 implies that:(∀x ∈ X ) : fˆt(d¯t)− E
d∼d¯t
[x(d)] >

2
.
Therefore, by linearity of expectation, Ed∼d¯t
[
ft(d)−preal(d)
]
= fˆt(d¯t)−Ed∼d¯t [preal(d)] ≥ 2 , which
amounts to the second case in Eq. (7).
We are now ready to conclude the proof by showing that T ′ < T . Assume towards contradiction
that T ′ = T . Therefore, by Eq. (7):
T

2
≤
T∑
t=1
∣∣ E
d∼d¯t
[
preal(d)− ft(d)
]∣∣
=
T∑
t=1
∣∣yt − E
d∼d¯t
[ft(d)]
∣∣− ∣∣yt − E
d∼d¯t
[preal(dt)]
∣∣ (yt = 1 ⇐⇒ Ed∼d¯t [preal(dt)] ≥ Ed∼d¯t [ft(d)])
=
T∑
t=1
∣∣yt − fˆt(d¯t)∣∣− E
x∼preal
[∣∣yt − E
d∼dt
x(dt)
∣∣]
≤
T∑
t=1
|yt − ft(d¯t)| −min
x∈X
|yt − E
d∼dt
[x(d)]|
≤ REGRETT (A).
≤
√
1
2
`∗T log T
Thus, we obtain that Tlog T ≤ 2`
∗
2 , however our choice of T =
⌈
4`∗
2 log
4`∗
2
⌉
ensures that this is
impossible. Indeed:
T
log T
≥
4`∗
2 log
4`∗
2
log 4`
∗
2 + log log
4`∗
2
=
4`∗
2
1 +
log log 4`
∗
2
log 4`
∗
2
>
4`∗
2
2
=
2`∗
2
.
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This finishes the proof of Item 1.
We end this section by proving Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof hinges on Von Neuman’s Minimax Theorem. Let D, f as in the
formulation of the theorem, and consider the following zero-sum game: the pure strategies of the
maximizer are indexed by d ∈ D, the pure strategies of the minimizer are indexed by x ∈ X, and
the payoff (for pure strategies) is defined by m(d, x) = f(d)− x(d). Note that the payoff function
for mixed strategies d¯ ∈ ∆(D), p ∈ ∆(X ) satisfies
m(d¯, p) = E
x∼p
[fˆ(d¯)− E
d∼d¯
x(d)] = E
d∼d¯
[
f(d)− E
x∼p
[x(d)]
]
.
We next apply Von Neuman’s Minimax Theorem on this game (Here we use the assumption
that X and, in turn, D are finite). The premise of the lemma amounts to
min
p∈∆(X )
max
d∈D
m(d, p) > /2.
Therefore, by the Minimax Theorem also
max
d¯∈∆(D)
min
x∈X
m(d¯, x) > /2,
which amounts to the conclusion of the lemma.
A remark. A natural variant of the GAM setting follows by letting the discriminator D to
adaptively change the target distribution preal as the game proceeds (D would still be required
to maintain the existence of a distribution preal which is consistent with all of its answers). This
modification allows for stronger discriminators and therefore, potentially, for a more restrictive
notion of GAM–Foolability. However, the above proof extends to this setting verbatim.
7.2.2 Lower Bound: Proof of Item 2
Let D be a class as in the theorem statement, let G be a generator for D, and let  < 12 . We will
construct a discriminator D and a target distribution preal such that G requires at least `
∗
2 rounds
in order to find p such that IPMD(p, preal) ≤ .
To this end, pick a shattered mistake-tree T of depth `∗ whose internal nodes are labelled by
elements of D and whose leaves are labelled by elements of X .
The discriminator. The target distribution will be a Dirac distribution δx where x is one of
the labels of T ’s leaves. We will use the following discriminator D which is defined whenever preal
is one of these distributions: assume that preal = δx, and consider all functions in D that label the
path from the root towards the leaf whose label is x,
d1, d2, . . . , d`∗ .
Let p1 be the distribution the generator submitted in the first round. Then the discriminator picks
the first i such that |pt(d1)− preal(d1)| > , and sends the generator either di or 1− di according
to the convention in Eq. (3). If no such di exists, the discriminator outputs WIN. Similarly,
at round t let it−1 denote the index of the distinguisher sent in the previous round; then, the
discriminator acts the same with the modification that it picks the first it−1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ `∗ such that
|pt(di)− preal(di)| > .
Analysis. The following claim implies that for every generator G, there exists a distribution δx
such that if preal = δx then the above discriminator D forces G to play at least `∗/2 rounds.
Claim 1. Let G be a generator for D. Pick preal uniformly at random from the set {δx :
x labels a leaf in T }. Then the expected number of rounds in the GAM game when G is the gen-
erator and D = D(T ) is the discriminator is at least `∗2 .
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Proof. For every i ≤ `∗, let Xi denote the indicator of the event that the i’th function on the path
towards the leaf corresponding to preal was used by D as a distinguisher. Note that the number
of rounds X satisfies X =
∑`∗
i=1Xi. Thus, by linearity of expectation it suffices to argue that
E[Xi] = Pr[Xi = 1] ≥ 1
2
.
Consider X1: let p1 denote the first distribution submitted by G. Note that X1 = 1 if
(i) p1(d1) ≥ 12 and the leaf labelled x belongs to the left subtree from the root, or
(ii) p1(d1) < 12 and the leaf labelled x belongs to the right subtree from the root.
In either way Pr[X1 = 1] ≥ 12 , since this leaf is drawn uniformly. Similarly, for every conditioning
on the values of X1, . . . , Xi−1 we have Pr[Xi = 1|X1 . . . Xi−1] ≥ 12 (follows from the same argument
applied on subtrees corresponding to the conditioning). This yields that E[Xi] = Pr[Xi = 1] ≥ 12
for every i as required.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof Roadmap. We will show the following entailments: 1⇒2⇒3⇒1. Then, given the equiv-
alence between Items 1 to 3 we will show that 1⇔4. This will conclude the proof.
Overview of 1⇒2. We next overview the derivation of 1⇒2 which is the most involved deriva-
tion. Let preal denote the target distribution we wish to fool. The argument relies on the following
simple observation: let S be a sufficiently large independent sample from preal. Then, it suffices
to privately output a distribution psyn such that IPMD(psyn, pS) ≤ 2 , where pS is the empiri-
cal distribution. Indeed, if S is sufficiently large then by standard uniform convergence bounds:
IPMD(pS , preal) ≤ 2 , which implies that IPMD(psyn, preal) ≤  as required.
The output distribution psyn is constructed using a carefully tailored Generative Adversarial
Machine with a private discriminator D. That is, D’s input distribution is the empirical distribu-
tion pS , and for every submitted distribution pt, it either replies with a discriminating function dt
or with “WIN” if no discriminating function exists. The crucial point is that it does so in a differen-
tially private manner with respect to the input sample S. The existence of such a discriminator D
follows via the assumed PAP-PAC learner.
Once the private discriminator D is constructed, we turn to find a generator G with a bounded
round complexity. This follows from Theorem 1 and a result by [1, 14]: by [1, 14] PAP-PAC
learnability implies a finite Littlestone dimension, and therefore by Theorem 1 there is a generatorG
with a bounded round complexity. The desired DP fooling algorithm then follows by letting G
and D play against each other and outputting the final distribution that G obtains. The privacy
guarantee follows by the composition lemma (Lemma 3) which bounds the privacy leakage in terms
of the number of rounds (which is bounded by the choice of G) and the privacy leakage per round
(which is bounded by the choice of D).
One difficulty that is handled in the proof arises because the discriminator is differentially pri-
vate and because the PAP-PAC algorithm may err with some probability. Indeed, these prevent D
from satisfying the requirements of a discriminator as defined in the GAM setting. In particular, D
cannot reply deterministically whether IPMD(pS , pt) <  as this could compromise privacy. Also,
whenever the assumed PAP-PAC algorithm errs, D may reply with an illegal distinguisher that
does not satisfy Eq. (3).
To overcome this difficulty we ensure that D satisfies the following with high probability: if
IPMD(pS , pt) >  then D outputs a legal dt, and if IPMD(pS , pt) < 2 then it outputs WIN as
required. When 2 ≤ IPMD(pS , pt) ≤  it may either output WIN or a legal discriminator dt. As
we show in the proof, this behaviour of D will not affect the correctness of the overall argument.
Proof of Theorem 2. The equivalence is proven by showing: 1⇒2⇒3⇒1 and 1⇔4.
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1⇒2. Let preal denote the unknown target distribution and let 0, δ0 be the error and confidence
parameters. Draw independently from preal a sufficiently large input sample S of size |S| to be
specified later. At this point we require |S| to be large enough so that IPMD(preal, pS) ≤ 02 with
probability at least 1− δ02 . By standard uniform convergence bounds ([51]) it suffices to require
|S| ≥ Ω
(d+ log(1/δ0)
20
)
, (8)
where d is the VC-dimension of D (observe that D must have a finite VC dimension as it is PAC
learnable). By the triangle inequality, this reduces our goal to privately output a distribution psyn
so that IPMD(pS , psyn) ≤ 02 with probability 1− δ02 (this will imply that IPMD(preal, psyn) ≤ 0
with probability 1− δ0).
As explained in the proof outline, the latter task is achieved by a carefully tailored Generative
Adversarial Machine which we will next describe. Inorder to construct the desired GAM, we first
observe that D is GAM–Foolable. Indeed, by Corollary 1 it suffices to argue that D has a finite
Littlestone dimension, which follows by [1] since D is privately learnable9.
Now, pick a generator G that fools D with round complexity T () as in Theorem 1, and pick
a discriminator D as in Fig. 3. Note that D uses a PAP-PAC learner for the class D ∪ (1 − D)
whose existence follows by from the PAP-PAC learnability of D via standard arguments (which
we omit). The next lemma summarizes the properties of D that are needed for the proof.
Lemma 6. Let D be the discriminator defined in Fig. 3 with input parameters (, δ, τ) and input
sample S, and let M be the assumed PAP-PAC learner for D ∪ (1 − D) with sample complexity
m(, δ) and privacy parameters (α, β). Then, D is
(
6τα(τ |S|) + τ, 4e6τα(τ |S|)τβ(τ |S|))-private,
and if S satisfies
|S| ≥ max
(
m(/8, τδ/2)
τ
,
64 log(τδ/2)
τ
)
(9)
then following holds with probability at least (1− τδ)
(i) If D outputs dt then pS(dt)− pt(dt) ≥ 2 .
(ii) If D outputs “WIN” then IPMD(pS , pt) ≤ .
We first use Lemma 6 to conclude the proof of 1⇒2 and then prove Lemma 6.
The fooling algorithm we consider proceeds as follows.
• Set the number of rounds T0 = |S|0.99.
• Set G to be a generator with round complexity T () and set its error parameter to be 02 .
• Set D be the discriminator depicted in Fig. 3 and set its parameters to be (, δ, τ) =
( 02 ,
δ0
2 ,
1
T0
) and its input sample to be S.
• Let G and D to play against each other for (at most) T0 rounds.
• Output the final distribution which is held by G.
We next prove the privacy and fooling properties as required by a DP algorithm:
Privacy. We argue that the algorithm is (α′, β′)–private, with α′(|S|) = O(1) and β′(|S|) negligi-
ble. Note that since G is deterministic then the output distribution pout is completely determined
by the sequence of discriminating functions d1, . . . , dT ′ outputted by the discriminator.
For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume that T ′ = T0: indeed, if T ′ < T0 then
extend it by repeating the last discriminating function; this does not change the fact that pout is
determined by the sequence d1, . . . , dT ′ , . . . dT0 .
Recall that by Lemma 6 D is ((6τ0α(τ0|S|) + τ0) ,
(
4e6τ0α(τ0|S|)τ0β(τ0|S|)
)
)-private. Therefore,
since the number of rounds in which D is applied is T0, by composition (Lemma 3) and post-
processing (Lemma 2) it follows that the entire algorithm is(
T0 (6τ0α(τ0|S|) + τ0) , T0
(
4e6τ0α(τ0|S|)τ0β(τ0|S|)
))
-private.
9 In fact, since D is properly privately learnable the result is already a corollary of the lower bound for proper
private learning by [14], combined with Theorem 3 in [1]
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Our choices of τ0 = 1T0 and T0 guarantee that 1/τ0 < m
0.99, and plugging it in yields privacy
guarantee of (6α(|S|0.001) + 1, 4eO(1)β(|S|0.001). As α(|S|0.001) = O(1) and β(|S|0.001) is negligible,
the desired privacy guarantee follows.
Fooling. First note that if S satisfies Eq. (9) with (, δ, τ) := (0, δ02 , τ0) then with probability
at least 1 − δ02 the following holds: in every iteration t ≤ T0, either pS(dt) − pt(dt) ≥ 04 , or the
discriminator yields WIN and IPMD(pS , pt) ≤ 02 . This follows by a union bound via the utility
guarantee in Lemma 6. Assuming this event holds, we claim that if |S| is set to satisfy |S|0.99 ≥
T ( 04 ) then the output distribution psyn satisfies IPMD(pS , psyn) ≤ 02 . This follows since as long as
the GAM game proceeds the generator suffers a loss of at least 04 in every round, and the number
of rounds is set as |S|0.99. Therefore we require
|S|0.99 ≥ T (0
4
)
= Ω
(`∗
20
log
`∗
0
)
. (10)
To conclude, if |S| is set to satisfy Eqs. (8) to (10) then with probability at least 1 − δ0
both IPMD(preal, pS) ≤ 02 and IPMD(pS , psyn) ≤ 02 , which implies that IPMD(preal, psyn) ≤ 0
as required. This concludes the proof of 1⇒2.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let S be the input sample, let pS denote the uniform distribution over S,
and let pt denote the distribution submitted by the generator. The discriminator operates as
follows (see Fig. 3): it feeds the assumed PAP-PAC learner a labeled sample S` = {(xi, yi)} that is
drawn from the following distribution qt: first the label yi is drawn uniformly from {0, 1}; if yi = 0
then draw xi ∼ pS and if yi = 1 then draw xi ∼ pt. Let dt denote the output of the PAP-PAC
learner on the input sample S. Observe that the loss Lqt(·) satisfies
Lqt(d) =
pS(d) + (1− pt(d))
2
=
1 + pS(d)− pt(d)
2
. (11)
Next, the discriminator checks whether pS(dt) − pt(dt) > 2 (equivalently, if Lqt(dt) < 1−/22 ),
and sends dt the generator if so, and reply with “WIN” otherwise. The issue is that checking
this "If" condition naivly may violate privacy, and in order to avoid it we add noise to this check
by a mechanism from [20] (see Fig. 4): roughly, this mechanism receives a data set of scalars
Σ = {σi}mi=1, a threshold parameter c and a margin parameters N , and outputs > if
∑m
i=1 σi >
c + O(1/N) or ⊥ if ∑mi=1 σi < c − O(1/N). The distinguisher applies this mechanism over the
sequence of scalars {dt(x1), . . . , dt(xm)}.
We next formally establish the privacy and utility guarantees of D. In what follows, assume
that the input sample S satisfies Eq. (9),
Privacy. The discriminator D is a composition of two procedures,M1 andM2, whereM1 applies
the PAP-PAC learnerM on the random subsample S`, andM2 runs the procedure THRESH. Thus,
the privacy guarantee will follow from the composition lemma (Lemma 3) if we show that M1 is
(6τα(τm), 4e6τα(τm)τβ(τm))-private andM2 is (τ, 0)-private. The privacy guarantee ofM1 follows
by applying10 Lemma 4 with v := |S| and n := |S`| = τ |S|, and the privacy guarantee ofM2 follows
from the statement in Fig. 4 since N|Σ| =
|S`|
|S| = τ .
Utility. Let qt denote the distribution from which the subsample S` is drawn. Note that by
Eq. (9), S` = τ · |S| ≥ m(/8, τδ/2). Therefore, since M PAC learns D, its output dt satisfies:
Lqt(dt) ≤ min
d∈D∪(1−D)
Lqt(d) +

8
,
with probability at least 1− τδ/2. By Eq. (11) this is equivalent to
pS(dt)− pt(dt) ≥ max
d∈D∪(1−D)
(
pS(d)− pt(d)
)− /4. (12)
Now, by plugging in the statement in Fig. 4: (Σ, c,N) := ({dt(x)}x∈S , pt(dt) + 58 , |S`|), and γ :=
τδ/2 and conditioning on the event that both M and THRESH succeed (which occurs with prob-
ability at least 1− τδ) it follows that
10Note that in order to apply Lemma 4 on M1, we need to assume that M satisfies (α, β) privacy with α ≤ 1.
This assumption does not lose generality – see the paragraph following the definition of Private PAC Learning.
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• Let M be a PAP-PAC learner for the class D ∪ (1−D) with sample complexity m(, δ).
• Let , δ, τ be the input parameters.
• Let S be the input sample, let pS be the uniform distribution over S, and let pt be the
distribution submitted by the generator.
• Draw a labelled sample S` = {(xi, yi)} of size τ · |S| independently as follows: draw the
label yi uniformly from {0, 1}
(i) if yi = 0 then draw xi ∼ pS ,
(ii) if yi = 1 then draw xi ∼ pt.
• Apply the learner M on the sample S` and set dt ∈ D as its output.
• Compute Z := THRESH ({dt(x)}x∈S , pt(dt) + 58 , |S`|).
(i) If Z = > then send the generator with dt,
(ii) else, Z =⊥ and reply the generator with “Win”.
Figure 3: Depiction of the private discriminator used in Theorem 2. The discriminator holds the
target distribution pS , where S is a sufficiently large sample from preal. In each round the discrim-
inator decides whether pS is indistinguishable from the distribution submitted by the generator
and replies accordingly.
THRESH. The procedure THRESH receives as input a dataset of scalars Σ = {σi}, a threshold
parameter c > 0 and a margin parameter N and has the following properties (see Theorem 3.23 in
[20] for proof of existence):
• THRESH(Σ, c,N) is (N/|Σ|, 0)-private.
• For every γ > 0:
– If 1|Σ|
∑
σ∈Σ σ > c+
8 log 1/γ
N then THRESH outputs > with probability at least 1− γ
– If 1|Σ|
∑
σ∈Σ σ < c− 8 log 1/γN then THRESH outputs ⊥ with probability at least 1− γ
Figure 4: The procedure: THRESH
(i) If D outputs dt then
pS(dt) ≥ c− 8 log(1/γ)
N
= pt(dt) +
5
8
− 8 log(τδ/2)
τ |S| ≥ pt(dt) +

2
,
where in the last inequality we used that |S| ≥ 64 log(τδ/2)τ (by Eq. (9)).
(ii) If D outputs WIN then by a similar calculation pS(dt) ≤ pt(dt) + 34 and therefore
IPMD(pS , pt) = max
d∈D∪(1−D)
(
pS(d)− pt(d)
) ≤ pS(dt)− pt(dt) + 
4
≤ ,
where in the first inequality we used Eq. (12).
This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.
2⇒3. This follows directly from the definition of a DP–Fooling algorithm. Indeed, given a DP–
Fooling algorithm with sample complexity m(, δ) and a sample S outputs a distribution psyn
such that IPMD(psyn, pS) ≤ , with probability at least (1 − δ) and satisfies (α, β)-privacy, with
α = O(1) and β negligible. To obtain a sanitizer, output the estimate EST : D → [0, 1], where
Est(d) = Ex∼psyn [d(x)].
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3⇒1. This follows from Theorem 5.5 in [8].
4⇒1. This is an immediate corollary of post-processing for differential privact (Lemma 2). In-
deed, by the private uniform convergence property we can privately estimate the losses of all
hypotheses in D, and then output any hypothesis in D that minimizes the estimated loss.
1⇒4. Suppose D is PAP-PAC learnable by an algorithm A. For every function d ∈ D, let d′
denote the (X ×{0, 1})→ {0, 1} function defined by d′((x, y)) = 1[d(x) 6=y], and let D′ = {d′ : d ∈
D}. Observe that for every sample S ⊆ (X × {0, 1})m:
LS(d) = pS(d
′), (13)
where LS(d) denotes the empirical loss of d and pS denotes the empirical measure of d′.
We claim that D′ is also PAP-PAC learnable: for a D′-example z′ = ((x, y), y′) let z denote the
D-example (x, |y′−y|), and note that d′ errs on z′ if and only if d errs on z. Therefore, a PAP-PAC
learner for D′ follows by using this transformation to convert the D′-input sample S′ = {z′i}mi=1 to
a D input sample S = {zi}mi=1, applying A on S and outputting d′, where d = A(S).
Therefore, by 1 =⇒ 3 it follows that D′ is sanitizable by a sanitizer M with sample com-
plexity m1(, δ). We next use M to show that D satisfies private uniform convergence: let P be a
distribution over X ×{0, 1} and , δ be the error and confidence parameters. Consider the following
algorithm:
• Draw a sample S from P of size m(, δ) = max{m1( 2 , δ2 ),m2( 2 , δ2 )}, where
m2 = O
(VC(D) + log(1/δ)
2
)
is the uniform convergence rate of D (note that by PAC learnability, VC(D) <∞).
• Apply M on S to obtain an estimator EST′ : D′ → [0, 1] and output the estimator EST :
D → [0, 1] defined by EST(d) = EST′(d′).
We want to show that
(∀d ∈ D) : |EST(d)− LP(d)| ≤ ,
with probability 1− δ. Indeed, since m ≥ m2( 2 , δ2 ) it follows that
(∀d ∈ D) : |LS(d)− LP(d)| ≤ 
2
,
with probability at least 1− δ2 , and since m ≥ m1( 2 , δ2 ),
(∀d ∈ D) : |EST(d)− LS(d)| = |EST′(d′)− pS(d′)| (by Eq. (13))
≤ /2,
with probability 1− δ2 . The desired bound thus follows by a union bound and the triangle inequality.
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A Proof of Corollary 4
We begin by defining the predictors fˆt’s that L uses: let L0 be the learner implied by Theorem 3.
We first turn L0 into a deterministic learner whose input is (p1, y1), . . . , (pT , yT ) ∈ ∆(W)× {0, 1}
and that outputs at each iteration ft : W → [0, 1]. Then, we extend ft linearly to fˆt as discussed
in Section 3.1. Let (p1, y1), . . . , (pT , yT ) ∈ ∆(W) × {0, 1}, given w ∈ W, the value ft(w) is the
expected output of the following random process:
• sample wi ∼ pi for i ≤ t− 1,
• apply L0 on the sequence (w1, y1), . . . , (wt−1, yt−1) to obtain the predictor f˜t, and
• output f˜t(x).
That is,
ft(x) = E
w1:t−1
[
E
f˜t∼L0
[f˜t(w)
∣∣∣ w1 . . . wt−1]],
where Ep1:t [·] denotes the expectation over sampling each wi from pi independently, and Ef˜t∼L0 [·]
denotes the expectation over the internal randomness of the algorithm L0 at iteration t. Fi-
nally, fˆt(p) = Ew∼p[ft(w)] is the predictor that L uses at the t’th round. Note that indeed fˆt is
determined (deterministically) from (p1, y1), . . . (pt−1, yt−1).
We next bound the regret: for every h ∈ H:
T∑
t=1
|fˆt(pt)− yt| − |hˆ(pt)− yt| =
∑
t:yt=0
fˆt(pt)− hˆ(pt) +
∑
t:yt=1
hˆ(pt)− fˆt(pt)
=
∑
{t:yt=0}
E
p1:t−1
[
E
L0
[E
pt
[ft(wt)]
∣∣∣ {wi}t−1i=1]]− E
p1:T
[h(xt)]
+
∑
{t:yt=1}
E
p1:T
[h(wt)]− E
p1:t−1
[
E
L0
[E
pt
[ft(wt)]
∣∣∣ {wi}t−1i=1]]
=
∑
{t:yt=0}
E
p1:T
[
E
L0
[ft(wt)
∣∣∣ {wi}Ti=1]]− E
p1:T
[h(wt)]
+
∑
{t:yt=1}
E
p1:T
[h(wt)]− E
p1:T
[
E
L0
[ft(wt)
∣∣∣ {wi}Ti=1]]
= E
p1:T
[
E
L0
[∑
yt=0
ft(wt)− h(wt) +
∑
yt=1
h(wt)− ft(wt)
∣∣∣ {wi}Ti=1]
]
= E
p1:T
[
E
L0
[ T∑
t=1
|ft(wt)− yt| − |h(wt)− yt|
∣∣∣ {wi}Ti=1]
]
≤ E
p1:T
[
REGRETT (L0, {wt, yt}Tt=1
]
≤
√
1
2
`T log T .
B Extending Theorem 1, Item 1 to infinite classes
Here we extend the proof of the upper bound in Theorem 1 to the case where X may be infinite.
Technical assumptions. The first technical milestone we need to consider in order to make the
GAM setting well-defined is is to pick a σ-algebra on X , which specifies the domain ∆(X ) from
which the generator’s distributions are taken. Clearly, every d ∈ D need to be measurable and we
therefore pick any11 σ–algebra that contains D.
11Since the intersections of σ-algebras is a σ-algebra, one can simply take the intersection of all σ-algebras that
contain D.
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Next, the proposed protocol in Fig. 2 chooses at each round a distribution d¯ ∈ ∆(D). Thus we
also need to define a σ-algebra over the class D and specify the space ∆(D). For this, we equip
{0, 1}X with the product topology (see Appendix B.1 for a definition) and consider D ⊆ {0, 1}X
with the induced subspace topology. This allows us to identify ∆(D) as the corresponding space
of Borel-probability measures.
Finally, we assume that X is well-behaved as a class of D → {0, 1} functions in the sense that
the standard uniform convergence property of VC classes applies to it12: for any measure d¯ ∈ ∆(D)
and  > 0, a sufficiently large independent sample d1 . . . dm ∼ d¯ satisfies with high probability that
(∀x ∈ X ) :
∣∣∣ E
d∼d¯
[d(x)]− 1
m
m∑
i=1
di(x)]
∣∣∣ ≤ .
This uniform convergence property is implied by the finiteness of VC(X ) under certain measurability
assumptions [51]. For the sake of brevity we simply assume this uniform convergence statement
and refer the reader to [9, 18] for standard measure theoretic assumptions that imply it.
A modification to the generator in Fig. 2. We will make some technical modifications in
the generator depicted in Fig. 2. The modification is depicted in Fig. 5. The first modification
Consider Fig. 2 with the following modification, at the Else Step:
• Find d¯t ∈ ∆(D), with finite support such that(∀x ∈ X ) : E
d∼d¯t
[ft(d)− x(d)] > 
4
(if no such d¯t exists then output “error”).
Figure 5: Modifying the algorithm in Fig. 2
we make is that in the Else step, the generator picks d¯t with finite support. For the finite case,
the requirement that d¯t has finite support is met trivially. The second modification is to allow a
further slack for the distinguisher (require advantage of > 4 instead of >

2 ).
Proof outline. To extend the proof to the infinite case it suffices to ensure that the generator
in Fig. 2 (with the modification in Fig. 5) never outputs “error” in the 2nd item of the “For” loop.
Towards this end, let us add the following notation that is consistent with the algorithm in Fig. 2.
Let f : D → [0, 1] be measurable.
1. If there exists p ∈ ∆(X ) such that
(∀d ∈ D) : E
x∼p
[f(d)− x(d)] ≤ 
2
,
we say that f satisfies Item 1.
2. If there exists d¯ ∈ ∆(D) such that(∀x ∈ X ) : E
d∼d¯
[f(d)− x(d)] > 
2
we say that f satisfies Item 2.
3. f is amenable if it satisfies either Item 1 or Item 2.
When X and D are finite, every f satisfies one of Items 1 or 2 (and hence amenable). This is
the content of Lemma 5 which is proved using LP duality (in the form of the Minmax Theorem).
However, the case when X and D are infinite is more subtle. Specifically, the Minmax Theorem
does not necessarily hold in this generality. Nevertheless, the next lemma guarantees the existence
of a learner A which only outputs amenable functions. Recall that fˆ : ∆(D) → [0, 1] denotes the
linear extension of f and is defined by fˆ(d¯) = Ed∼d¯[f(d)].
12note that VC(X ) <∞ since it is the dual class of D, and VC(D) ≤ Ldim(D) <∞.
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Lemma 7. Let D be a discriminating class with dual Littlestone dimension `∗, and let T be the
horizon. Then, there exists a deterministic online learning algorithm A for the dual class X that
receives labelled examples from the domain ∆(D) and uses predictors of the form fˆt for some ft :
D → [0, 1], such that:
1. A’s regret is O(
√
`∗T log T ), and
2. For all t ≤ T , if in the sequence of observed examples (d¯1, y1), . . . , (d¯t−1, yt−1) up to itera-
tion t, each d¯t has a finite support then ft is amenable (in particular f1 is amenable).
The next Lemma says that the algorithm in Fig. 2 with the modification depicted in Fig. 5
indeed never outputs error:
Lemma 8. Consider the generator in Fig. 2 with the modification depicted in Fig. 5. Assume A
is the online learner whose existence is implied by Lemma 7. Then for all t ≤ T the generator
never outputs error.
Proof. We want to show that at every step t, if the algorithm reaches the else step in Fig. 5 then
there exists a distribution d¯t with finite supports which satisfies(∀x ∈ X ) : E
d∼d¯t
[ft(d)− x(d)] > 
4
.
Indeed, by the modification in Fig. 5 up to iteration t the generator fed the learner A with
(d¯1, y1), . . . (d¯t−1, yt−1) such that each d¯i’s has a finite support. Therefore, by Lemma 7, Item 2
the function ft is amenable and thus there exists d¯ such that(∀x ∈ X ) : E
d∼d¯
[ft(d)− x(d)] > 
2
.
To get the desired finitely supported d¯t we use uniform convergence: consider X as an hypothesis
class over D and note that since X has a finite Littlestone then it also has a finite VC dimension.
Therefore, by uniform convergence for VC classes there exists a finite sequence d1, . . . , dm ∼ d¯ such
that: (∀x ∈ X ) : ∣∣∣ E
d∼d¯
[f1(d)− x(d)]− 1
m
m∑
i=1
[f1(di)− x(di)]
∣∣∣ ≤ 
4
.
(by uniform convergence, a sufficiently large independent sample from d¯ satisfies it with high prob-
ability). In particular, d¯t can be chosen to be the empirical13 distribution induced by d1, . . . , dm.
Lemma 7, together with Lemma 8, implies the upper bound in Theorem 1, Item 1 via the same
argument as in the finite case. This follows by picking the online learner used by the generator in
Fig. 2 as in Lemma 7; the amenability of the ft’s (and Lemma 8) implies that the protocol never
outputs “error”, and the rest of the argument is exactly the same like in the finite case (with slight
deterioration in the constants).
Corollary 5. Let A be an algorithm like in the above Lemma. Then, if one uses A as the online
learner in the algorithm in Fig. 2, together with the modification in Fig. 5, then the round complexity
of it is at most O( `
∗
2 log
`∗
 ), as in Theorem 1, Item 1.
In the remainder of this section we prove Lemma 7.
B.1 Preliminaries
We first present standard notions and facts from topology and functional analysis that will be
used. We refer the reader to [41, 40] for further reading.
13I.e. with probability mass function d¯t(d) = 1m
∑m
i=1 1[d = di]
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Weak* topology. Given a compact Haussdorf space K, let ∆(K) denote the space of Borel
measures over K, and let C(K) denote the space of continuous real functions over K. The weak*
topology over ∆(K) is defined as the weakest14 topology so that for any continuous function f ∈
C(K) the following “∆(K)→ R” mapping is continuous
Tf (µ) =
∫
f(k)dµ(k).
We will rely on the following fact, which is a corollary of Banach–Alaglou Theorem (see e.g.
Theorem 3.15 in [40]) and the duality between C(K) and B(K), the class of Borel measures over K:
Claim 2. Let K be a compact Haussdorf space. Then ∆(K) is compact in the weak* topology.
Upper and lower semicontinuity. Recall that a real function f is called upper semicontinuous
(u.s.c) if for every α ∈ R the set {x : f(x) ≥ α} is closed. Note that lim supx→x0 f(x) ≤ f(x0) for
any x0 in the domain of f . Similarly, f is called lower semicontinuous (l.s.c) if −f is u.s.c. We will
use the following fact:
Claim 3. Let K be a compact Haussdorf space and assume E ⊆ K is a closed set. Consider the
“∆(K) → [0, 1]” mapping TE(µ) = µ(E). Then TE is u.s.c with respect to the weak* topology on
∆(X).
Proof. This fact can be seen as a corollary of Urysohn’s Lemma (Lemma 2.12 in [41]). Indeed,
Borel measures are regular (see definition 2.15 in [41]. Thus, for every closed set E we have
µ(E) = inf
{U :E⊆U, U is open}
µ(U).
Fix a closed set E. Urysohn’s Lemma implies that for every open set U ⊇ E, there exists a
continuous function fU ∈ C(K) such that χE ≤ fU ≤ χU , where χA is the indicator function over
the set A (i.e. χA(x) = 1 if and only if x ∈ A).
Thus, we can write µ(E) = inf{U :E⊆U, U is open} µ(fU ), where µ(fU ) = Ex∼µ[fU ]. Now, by
continuity of fU , it follows that the mapping µ 7→ µ(fU ) is continuous with respect to the weak*
topology on ∆(X). Finally, the claim follows since the infimum of continuous functions is u.s.c.
Sion’s Theorem. We next state the following generalization of Von-Neumann’s Theorem for
u.s.c/l.s.c payoff functions.
Theorem 4 (Sion’s Theorem). Let W be a compact convex subset of a linear topological space
and U a convex subset of a linear topological space. If F is a real valued function on W × U with
• F (w, ·) is l.s.c and convex on U and
• F (·, u) is u.s.c and concave on W
then,
max
w∈W
inf
u∈U
F (w, u) = inf
u∈U
max
w∈W
F (w, u)
Tychonof’s space. The last notion we introduce is the topology we will use on {0, 1}X . Given an
arbitrary set W, the space F = {0, 1}W is the space of all functions f :W → {0, 1}. The product
topology on F is the weakest topology such that for every w ∈ W the mapping Πw : F → {0, 1},
defined by Πw(f) = f(w) is continuous.
A basis of open sets in the product topology is provided by the sets Uw1,...,wm(g) of the form:
Uw1,...,wm(g) = {f : g(wi) = f(wi) i = 1, . . . ,m},
where w1, . . . , wm are arbitrary elements in W and g ∈ F .
A remarkable fact about the product topology is that the space F is compact for any domainW
(see for example [31]). We summarize the above discussion in the following claim
Claim 4. Let W be an arbitrary set and consider F = {0, 1}W equipped with the product topology.
Then F is compact and Πw ∈ C(F) for every w ∈ W, where Πw is defined as Πw(f) = f(w).
14In the sense that every other topology with this property contains all open sets in the weak* topology.
29
B.2 Two Technical Lemmas
The proof of Lemma 7 follows from the following two lemmas. Throughout the proofs we will treat
D as a topological subspace in {0, 1}X with the product topology, and ∆(D) as a topological space
equipped with the weak∗ topology which is induced by topology on D.
Lemma 9 (Analog of Lemma 5). Assume D ⊆ {0, 1}X is closed and let f : D → [0, 1]. Assume
that fˆ is u.s.c (with respect to the weak* topology on ∆(D)) then f is amenable.
Lemma 10 (Analog of Corollary 4). Let D ⊆ {0, 1}X be closed and let `∗ denote its dual Littlestone
dimension. Then, there exists a deterministic online learner that receives labelled examples from
the domain ∆(D) such that for every sequence (d¯t, yt)Tt=1 we have that:
REGRETT (L) ≤
√
1
2
`T log T
Moreover, at each iteration t the predictor, fˆt, used by L is of the form fˆt
[
d¯
]
= Ed∼d¯(ft(d)) for
some ft : D → [0, 1]. Finally, for every t ≤ T if each d¯i for i < t has a finite support then fˆt is
u.s.c.
We first show how to conclude the proof of Lemma 7 using these lemmas and later prove the
two lemmas.
Concluding the proof of Lemma 7. The proof follows directly from the two preceding Lem-
mas. Given a discriminating class D ⊆ {0, 1}X there is no loss of generality in assuming D is closed,
since closing the class with respect to the product topology does not increase its dual LIttlestone
dimension.
Now, take the learner A whose existence follows from Lemma 10. Since each fˆt is u.s.c we
obtain via Lemma 9 that each ft is also amenable.
Proof of Lemma 9. Lemma 9 extends Lemma 5 to the infinite case. Similar to the proof
of Lemma 5 which hinges on Von-Neumann’s Minmax Theorem, the proof here hinges on Sion’s
Theorem which is valid in this setting.
Before proceeding with the proof we add the following notation: let RXfin denote the space of
real-valued functions v : X → R with finite support, i.e. v(x) = 0 except for maybe a finite many
x ∈ X . We equip RXfin with the topology induced by the `1 norm, namely a basis of open sets is
given by the open balls Uv, = {u :
∑
x∈X |v(x)−u(x)| < }. Rfin(X ) is indeed a linear topological
space (i.e. the vector addition and scalar multiplication mappings are continuous). Finally, define
∆fin(X ) := {p ∈ RXfin : p(x) ≥ 0
∑
x∈X
p(x) = 1}.
Next, let f : D → [0, 1] be such that fˆ is u.s.c. Our goal is to show that f is amenable. Set F
to be the following real-valued function over ∆(D)×∆fin(X ):
F (d¯, p) = E¯
d∼d
[
f(d)−
∑
x∈X
p(x)x(d)
]
It suffices to show that
max
d¯∈∆(D)
inf
p∈∆fin(X )
F (d¯, x) = inf
p∈∆fin(X )
max
d¯∈∆(D)
F (d¯, p) (14)
Indeed, the assumption that Item 1 does not hold implies in particular that
inf
p∈∆fin(X )
max
d∈∆(D)
F (d¯, p) ≥ 
2
.
Eq. (14) then states that
max
d¯∈∆(D)
inf
x∈X Ed∼d¯
[f(d)− x(d)] ≥ 
2
.
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which proves that Item 2 holds.
Eq. (14) follows by an application of Theorem 4 on the function F . Thus, we next show
the premise of Theorem 4 is satisfied by F . Indeed, W = ∆(D) is compact and convex, and
U = ∆fin(X ) is convex. We show that F (·, p) is concave and u.s.c for every fixed p ∈ ∆fin(X ):
indeed, F (·, p) is in fact linear and therefore concave. We show that F (·, p) is u.s.c by showing that
it is the sum of (i) a u.s.c function (i.e. Ed∼d¯[f(d)]) and (ii) finitely many continuous functions (i.e.∑
x∈X p(x)Ed∼d¯[x(d)]). Indeed, (i) by assumption fˆ(d¯) = Ed∼d¯[f(d)] is u.s.c, and (ii) by Claim 4,
the mapping Πx(d) is continuous for every x ∈ X which, by the definition of the weak* topology,
implies that d¯→ Ed∼d¯ Πx(d) = Ed∼d¯ [x(d)] is continuous.
Finally, because Ed∼d¯[x(d)] ≤ 1 is bounded, it follows that F (d¯, ·) is linear and continuous in p
for every fixed d¯: indeed treating fˆ(d¯) and {Ed¯∼d [x(d)]}x∈X as bounded constants, we have that:
F (d¯, p) = fˆ(d¯)−
∑
x∈X
p(x) E¯
d∼d
[x(d)]
Proof of Lemma 10. We will show that the learner which is derived in Corollary 4 satisfies the
conclusion of Lemma 10. The regret bound and the fact that the learner outputs a predictor of
the form fˆt = Ed¯∼d [ft(d)] follows from Corollary 4.
Therefore, it suffices to show that the ft’s can be chosen to be u.s.c. This follows from an
examination of the proof provided in [10] for Theorem 3 and our extension of it to Corollary 4 as
detailed next. The authors in [10] use the following type of functions. Call a function s : D → {0, 1}
an SOA-type function15 if there exists a hypothesis class H ⊆ X such that
s(d) =
{
0 Ldim(H|(d,0)) = Ldim(H)
1 else
where H|(d,0) = {h ∈ H : h(d) = 0}. In the proof by [10] of Theorem 3 the authors construct
an online learner which in each iteration t uses a randomized predictor (i.e. a distribution over
predictors) which only uses SOA-type functions. Namely, the algorithm maintains a distribution qt
over a finite set of SOA type functions {sk}, and predicts according to sk with probability qt(sk).
The extension in Corollary 4 of this predictor to the domain ∆(D) is done by setting:
ft(d) = E¯
d1:T
[
E
s∼L0
[s(d)|d1, . . . , dt−1]
]
= E¯
d1:T
[∑
qt(sk)sk(d)|d1, . . . , dt−1
]
.
Namely, ft(d) is defined by taking expectation both over the choice of the algorithm and over the
sequence d1, . . . , dt−1, which is drawn from d¯1, . . . , d¯t−1. Since d¯1, . . . d¯t−1 have finite support we
can summarize these expectations and write:
ft =
∑
λksk,
for some choice of SOA-type functions and weights λk ≥ 0 where
∑
k λk = 1. Now, since the sum
of u.s.c functions is u.s.c and since the multiplication of a u.s.c function with positive scalar is u.s.c,
it is enough to prove that every SOA-type function s induces a u.s.c function over ∆(D) via the
rule µ 7→ µ ({d : s(d) = 1}). By Claim 3 it is enough to show that the set s−1(0) is open. To this
end we show that for every d ∈ s−1(0) there is an open neighborhood of d which is contained in
s−1(0). Indeed, if d ∈ s−1(0), then there exist x1, . . . , x2` that d(xi) = 0 for all i, and they shatter
a tree. Consider the open neighborhood of d defined by U = ∩i{d : d(xi) = 0}. U ⊆ s−1(0) since if
there were d′ ∈ U such that s(d′) = 1 then Ldim(H|(d′,0)) < Ldim(H) = `. However, since d′ ∈ U
then x1, . . . , x2` ∈ H|(d′,0) and they shatter a tree of depth ` which is a contradiction.
15SOA stands for Standard Optimal Algorithm; this definition was used by Littlestone [34].
31
